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In humans, there is a trade-off between the need to respond optimally to the salient envi-
ronmental stimuli and the need to meet our long-term goals. This implies that a system of
salience sensitive control exists, which trades task-directed processing off against moni-
toring and responding to potentially high salience stimuli that are irrelevant to the current
task. Much cognitive control research has attempted to understand these mechanisms
using non-affective stimuli. However, recent research has emphasized the importance of
emotions, which are a major factor in the prioritization of competing stimuli and in direct-
ing attention. While relatively mature theories of cognitive control exist for non-affective
settings, exactly how emotions modulate cognitive processes is less well understood.
The attentional blink (AB) task is a useful experimental paradigm to reveal the dynamics of
both cognitive and affective control in humans. Hence, we have developed the glance–look
model, which has replicated a broad proﬁle of data on the semantic AB task and character-
ized how attentional deployment ismodulated by emotion.Taking inspiration fromBarnard’s
Interacting Cognitive Subsystems, the model relies on a distinction between two levels of
meaning: implicational and propositional, which are supported by two corresponding men-
tal subsystems: the glance and the look respectively. In our model, these two subsystems
reﬂect the central engine of cognitive control and executive function. In particular, the inter-
action within the central engine dynamically establishes a task ﬁlter for salient stimuli using
a neurobiologically inspired learning mechanism. In addition, the somatic contribution of
emotional effects is modeled by a body-state subsystem. We argue that stimulus-driven
interaction among these three subsystems governs the movement of control between
them. The model also predicts attenuation effects and fringe awareness during the AB.
Keywords: computational modeling, attentional blink, emotion, cognitive control, body-state
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive control is typically deﬁned as the biasing of cogni-
tive functions, perhaps especially perception and response, to
promote “task-appropriate” behavior, and particularly to over-
ride pre-potent responses. While a valuable working hypothesis,
such a deﬁnition poses several questions: what constitutes task-
appropriate, indeed, what constitutes a task and, ultimately, what
constitutes an organism’s goals? Due partially to the constraints
imposed by experimental method, the notions of task, goal and,
thus, cognitive control, have tended to be narrowly prescribed.
For example, the concept of task has, if only tacitly, been directly
associated with the set of task instructions that can be easily
and unambiguously imposed in well-controlled laboratory exper-
iments; e.g., a participant might be instructed to report a letter in
the color red.
This deﬁnition of cognitive control is, of course, limiting, artiﬁ-
cial, and not fully reﬂective of the diversity of goal-driven control
processes to be found beyond the sphere of traditional experi-
mental work. For example, many psycholinguistic phenomena,
such as, the Moses illusion (Erickson and Mattson, 1981), suggest
that task set does not enforce strict categorical boundaries. In
particular, the trajectory of task-focused processing seems unper-
turbed by small semantic inconsistencies; that is, when processing
demands are high, the central executive seems contentwith a broad
schematic consistency of meaning. In addition, although only rel-
atively recently considered in the laboratory, it would seem clear
that affect and body-state feedback in general, has a major role
in guiding perception and action over and above its immediate
goals. To take a very obvious example, “ﬂight or ﬁght” responses
to threatening stimuli are surely prioritized, and accordingly bias
attentional and response processes. In the extreme case, Ohman
and Soares (1994) have shown that, compared to healthy con-
trols, phobics have larger skin conductance responses to masked
fear related pictures, such as snakes, even when they were unaware
of their presentation. In addition, it has been reported that anx-
iety can modulate attentional control (Koster et al., 2006), or
delay the disengagement of visual attention away from threaten-
ing stimuli (Fox et al., 2001; Yiend and Mathews, 2001; Georgiou
et al., 2005). Bishop et al. (2004) have also shown an interaction
between anxiety state and attentional focus on threatening stimuli.
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Moreover, Leyman et al. (2007) have reported that patients with
major depressive disorders show enhanced attention to angry faces
compared to controls.
The literature’s restricted perspective on cognitive control is
particularly apparent in neural modeling of task set. Neural net-
workmodels that address the issue at all, typically realize cognitive
control as a statically conﬁgured task-demand system(Cohen et al.,
1990; Houghton and Tipper, 1994; Bowman and Wyble, 2007;
Zylberberg et al., 2010), which simply foregrounds task relevant
pathways and backgrounds others. In particular, in such models,
there is little consideration for how such a task-demand system
knows what to foreground and what to background; how it might,
indeed, conﬁgure such biasing; how these conﬁgurations may
change according to performance; and the interaction between
such conﬁgurations and affective/body-state inﬂuences. Model-
ing work focused on notions of conﬂict and entropy (Botvinick
et al., 2001; Davelaar, 2008; Wyble et al., 2008), have brought
a richer perspective on cognitive control, but the interrelation-
ship between representation of meaning, affect, body-state, and
dynamic reconﬁguration of task set, remains only superﬁcially
explored.
Our central tenet is, then, that cognitive control does not pro-
vide a perfectly delineated task ﬁlter, which enforces absolute,
affect-immune, categorical boundaries between target and non-
target. In addition, we argue that this “imprecision” ought, in
fact, to be adaptive and, thus, of functional value for the organ-
ism. There are a number of ways in which this imprecision may
manifest itself.
1. Enforcement of task set may, to a signiﬁcant degree, be reliant
upon schematic (categorically loose) representations; what
might be called gist meaning.
2. Affect and body-state in general may play a major role in guid-
ing task-focus; and they interfere with goal-directed processing
via two different pathways, i.e., by a body-state route or by a fast
and direct route that bypasses body-state. In addition, as often
demonstrated, anxiety impacts the reconﬁguration of task set.
3. The beneﬁt of (more schematic) gist-based ﬁltering may be
observed when the attentional system is challenged to the point
of near-overload, as exempliﬁed by phenomena such as fringe
awareness (Mangan, 2001; May, 2004) and improved atten-
tional blink (AB) performance in the presence of distraction
(Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Taatgen et al., 2007).
Our glance–look model realizes this broader notion of cognitive
control by partitioning central executive mediated salience detec-
tion into two stages. The ﬁrst of these, the glance, undertakes a
schematic glimpse at meaning and is, also, the site at which affec-
tive and bodily evaluations guide attentional focus. In contrast,
the second stage, the look, operates in a fashion more consistent
with classic perspectives on salience detection and task-focus. That
is, it performs a more detailed (referentially speciﬁc) analysis of
meaning. These two stages map directly onto the propositional
and implicational central executive subsystems in Barnard’s (1985)
interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS).
We will present the glance–lookmodel and its interpretation of
cognitive control as follows. Firstly, we will provide background
on the experimental paradigm, i.e., the AB task (Raymond et al.,
1992), which is well suited to revealing the dynamics of both cog-
nitive and affective control in humans. In particular, it has been
observed with ERP (Flaisch et al., 2007) and psychophysiologi-
cally (Phelps et al., 2006) that emotion does not only affect the
processing of the affective stimulus itself, but also following stim-
uli, emphasizing the importance of the temporal proﬁle of affective
salience. We will argue that the AB task provides a suitable plat-
form to study the complicated temporal structure when cognition
and emotion interact. And then, we will review and highlight
the structure and principles of the model’s realization of salience
detection and attentional control. The theory of the glance–look
model is inherited from ICS; however, this particular computa-
tional implementation and its parameter setting are systematically
justiﬁed here. In particular, a unique modeling approach with
mathematical formalization of the model parameters is detailed
in Appendix.
Secondly, we will model several experimental results from the
literature covering semantic and affective inﬂuences on attentional
control and AB attenuation effects due to distraction. In Experi-
ment 1, we will describe how the glance–look model explains the
semantic key-distractor AB phenomenon (Barnard et al., 2004).
This will demonstrate the model’s two levels of meaning: impli-
cational (when glancing) and propositional (when looking). In
particular, we will explain the ﬁnding of a classic AB in the seman-
tic key-distractor task in terms of the glance subsystem’s focus on
(implicational) gist meaning. Furthermore, this meaning is rep-
resented in a self-organizing statistical learning framework: latent
semantic analysis (LSA, Landauer and Dumais, 1997; Landauer
et al., 1998, 2007). In Experiment 2, and again in a key-distractor
AB setting, we consider the role of affective salience in guiding
attentional focus. This involves adding a body-state subsystem to
the glance–lookmodel. In thisway,wemodel the capacity for affec-
tively charged key-distractors to generate a variety of AB proﬁles
(Barnard et al., 2005; Arnell et al., 2007), dependent upon intrinsic
salience of the affective key-distractor and participant group (anx-
ious vs. non-anxious). In Experiment 3, we consider how guide of
cognitive control by gist meaning can be functionally beneﬁcial.
We do this by exploring how the glance–look model exhibits a rel-
atively graceful degradation in perception at high sensory loads,
generating fringe awareness. In addition, we argue that, some-
what counter-intuitively, an increased reliance on implicational
(gist) meaning can improve behavioral performance, consistent
with overinvestment theories of temporal attention and the ben-
eﬁcial effect of distraction upon AB performance (Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Taatgen et al., 2007).
Finally, we will draw general conclusions on the glance–look
model’s contributions in broadening the notion of cognitive and
affective control. We will also suggest some possible neural cor-
relates of our model, in particular, relating it to several cognitive




Humans have an exceptional capacity for assessing the salience
of the stimuli that arise in their environment and for adjusting
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processing accordingly. For example, when standing on a street
corner we are subject to a plethora of stimuli: cars passing, con-
versations amongst pedestrians, and street vendors plying their
trade. When placed in such environments, humans are very good
at prioritizing these competing stimuli: directing attention toward
the highest priority events and ignoring the rest. Furthermore,
when we perceive a signiﬁcant event, such as a car careening off
the road, the current task is interrupted and attention is redirected
to reacting to the new event. It is also clear that there is a trade-off
between the need to meet (potentially long-term) goals and the
need to respond optimally according to the salience level of envi-
ronmental stimuli. This suggests that a system of salience sensitive
control exists, which trades goal-directed processing off against
monitoring and responding to (potentially high salience) stimuli
that are irrelevant to the current task. In previous work, we have
proposed the glance–look model, which formally speciﬁes mental
representations and processes that support salience detection and
attentional control in the context of temporal attention (Su et al.,
2009; Bowman et al., 2011).
A classic experimental paradigm that explores the temporal
deployment of attention is the AB task. Following on from ear-
lier work by Broadbent and Broadbent (1987), Raymond et al.
(1992) were the ﬁrst to use the term AB. The task they used
involved letters being presented using rapid serial visual presen-
tation (RSVP) at around 10 items a second at the same spatial
location. One letter (T1) was presented in a distinct color and was
the target whose identity was to be reported. A second target (T2)
followed after a number of intervening items, presence or absence
of T2 was to be reported. Typically, participants had to report
whether the letter “X”was among the items that followed T1. The
key ﬁnding was that report of T2 was impaired as a function of
serial position. That is, T2s occurring immediately after T1 were
accurately detected – a phenomenon typically described as lag-1
sparing (Wyble et al., 2009). Detection then declined across serial-
positions 2, and also 3, and then recovered to baseline around lags
5 or 6 (corresponding to a target onset asynchrony in the order of
500–600ms).
As research on the blink and RSVP in general has progressed,
it has become evident that the allocation of attention over time
is affected by the meaning of items (Maki et al., 1997) and their
personal salience (Shapiro et al., 1997b). There is also evidence
from electrophysiological recording that the meaning of a target is
processed even when it is not reported (Shapiro and Luck, 1999).
In order to examine semantic effects, Barnard et al. (2004) used
a variant of the AB paradigm in which no perceptual features were
present to distinguish targets from background items. In this task,
wordswere presented at ﬁxation inRSVP format. Targetswere only
distinguishable from background items in terms of their meaning.
This variant of the paradigm did not rely on dual target report.
Rather, participants were simply asked to report a word if it refers
to a job or profession for which people get paid, such as “waitress,”
and these targets were embedded in a list of backgroundwords that
all belonged to the same category. In this case, they were inanimate
things or phenomena encountered in natural environments; see
Figure 1. However, streams also contained a key-distractor item,
which, althoughnot in the target category,was semantically related
to that category. The serial position that the target appeared after
the key-distractor was varied. We call this the key-distractor AB
task, which, importantly, enables us to observe and quantify the
semantic imprecision of the task ﬁlter. That is, the key-distractor
is not in the target category. However, it is semantically related
to that category. The critical question, then, is can key-distractors
capture attention, even though strictly, they are task irrelevant.
Participants could report the target word (accurate report), say
“Yes” if they were conﬁdent a job word had been there, but could
not say exactly what it was (to capture some degree of awareness
of meaning), or say “No” if they did not see a target, and there
were, of course, trials on which no target was presented. When
key-distractors were household items, a different category from
both background and target words, there was little inﬂuence on
target report. However, key-distractors that referenced a property
of a human agent, but not one for which they were paid, like
“tourist” or “husband,” gave rise to a classic and deep blink, see
Figure 5. We call household items low salient (LS) key-distractors
FIGURE 1 |Task schema for the key-distractor AB task; adapted from Barnard et al. (2004).
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and human items high salient (HS) key-distractors. Thus, the task
ﬁlter during an AB task can, at least partially, be “tricked” when
facing semantically salient, but, in fact task irrelevant, stimuli.
THEORY OF THE GLANCE–LOOK MODEL
Over the last 20 years, the AB task has been the subject of very
extensive empirical research, coupled with the development of a
substantial bodyof theory (e.g., seeChunandPotter,1995; Shapiro
et al., 1997a; Visser et al., 1999; Bowman andWyble, 2007). A spe-
ciﬁc focus for the glance–look model has been the key-distractor
AB (Barnard et al.,2004),which itmodels usingparallel distributed
executive function. In this section, we will explain three principles
that underlie the model and govern its perspective on cognitive
control: sequential processing, two stages, and serial allocation of
attention. Although the basic structure of themodel has been pro-
posed previously (Su et al., 2009; Bowman et al., 2011), parameter
setting is only systematically justiﬁed here, and a unique mod-
eling approach with mathematical formalization of the model is
provided in Appendix. Importantly, in subsequent sections, where
the model’s scope is extended to other AB phenomena, e.g., the
affective blink and the attenuation effect, the model parameters
are unchanged.
Sequential processing
With any RSVP task, items arrive in sequence and need to be
correspondingly processed. Thus, we require a basic method for
representing this sequential arrival and processing of items. At one
level, we can view our approach as implementing a pipeline. New
items enter the front of the pipeline (in this case, from the visual
system); they are then fed through until they reach the back of
the pipeline (where they enter the response system). The key data
structure that implements this pipeline metaphor is a delay-line.
This is a simple mechanism for representing time constrained ser-
ial order. One can think of a delay-line as an abstraction for items
passing (in turn) through a series of processing levels. In this sense,
it could be viewed as a symbolic analog of a sequence of layers in
a neural network; a particularly strong analog being with synﬁre
chains (Abeles et al., 1993).
Every cycle, a new item enters the pipeline and all items cur-
rently in transit are pushed along one place. We shall refer to this
as the delay-line update cycle, and assume that one cycle corre-
sponds to 20ms. This assumption is justiﬁed by the observation
that underlying neural mechanisms can represent updates on a
time scale of tens of milliseconds (Bond, 1999; Panzeri et al., 2001).
Thus, in each delay-line update cycle, all delay-lines increment by
one slot every 20ms. Note, the update rate of the model is every
5ms. This assumption is not constrained by neurobiology, but by
the requirement of simulation, i.e., the sampling rate has to be
faster than the update rate of constituent representations. This
ﬁne grain of time course allows us to be more discriminating with
regard to the temporal properties of the AB. However, a high sam-
pling rate would have implementation costs, in terms of how long
simulations would take to run.
A delay-line is a very natural mechanism to use in order to cap-
ture the temporal properties of a blink experiment,which is inher-
ently a time constrained order task. To illustrate the data structure,
consider a delay-line of 10 elements, as shown in Figure 2, where
FIGURE 2 | A 10-slot delay-line with three RSVP items in progress
through it.
indices indicate the position of the constituent representations of
the corresponding RSVP item/word. We shall use this terminol-
ogy throughout, i.e., a single RSVP item will be modeled by a
number of constituents in a delay-line representation. We assume
six constituent representations comprise one RSVP item/word,
which approximates the 110-ms presentation used in most AB
experiments (e.g., Barnard et al., 2004).
A constituent representation in the model contains three vari-
ables. The ﬁrst one is the identity of the item. The second and the
third elements are an implicational and a propositional salience
assessment respectively. The origins of these terms are outlined
in later sections. The salience assessments are initially set to
un-interpreted.
Two stages
As noted earlier, a number of theoretical explanations and indeed
computationalmodels of theAB have been proposed; see Bowman
andWyble (2007) for a review.However, apart from themodel dis-
cussed in Barnard and Bowman (2003), all these proposals seek to
explain “basic” blink tasks, in which items in the RSVP stream are
semantically primitive, e.g., letters or digits. Consequently, none
of these “mainstream” theories or models is directly applicable to
semantic and affective inﬂuences on the shape of the blink curves.
However, of these previous theories, that introduced by Chun and
Potter (1995) has some similarities to this model. Their theory
assumes two stages of processing. The ﬁrst stage performs an ini-
tial evaluation to determine featural properties of items, including
“categorical” features. This stage is not capacity limited and is
subject to rapid forgetting. The second stage builds upon and
consolidates the results of the ﬁrst in order to develop a repre-
sentation of the target sufﬁcient for subsequent report. This stage
is capacity limited, invokes central conceptual representations and
storage, and is only initiated by detection of the potential target
on the ﬁrst stage.
Like Chun and Potter (1995), we have argued elsewhere for
a two-stage model (Barnard and Bowman, 2003; Barnard et al.,
2004), but recast to focus exclusively on semantic analysis and
executive processing. In particular, Barnard and Bowman (2003)
modeled the key-distractor blink task using a two-stage model. In
the context of modeling distributed control, we implemented the
two-stage model as a dialog between two levels of meaning. In the
ﬁrst stage, a generic level of semantic representation is monitored
and initially used to determine if an incoming item is salient. If it
is found to be so, then, in the second stage, the speciﬁc referential
meaning of the word is subjected to detailed semantic scrutiny in
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order to access its salience in the context of the speciﬁc task set.
In this stage, a word’s meaning is actively evaluated in relation to
the required referential properties of the target category. If this
reveals a match, then the target is encoded for later report. The
ﬁrst of these stages is somewhat akin to ﬁrst taking a “glance” at
generic meaning, with the second akin to taking a closer “look”
at the relationship between the meaning of the incoming item
and the target category. These two stages are implemented in two
distinct semantic subsystems proposed within our model for cog-
nitive and affective control: the implicational subsystem or Implic
(which supports the ﬁrst stage) and the propositional subsystem or
Prop (which supports the second; Barnard, 1999). Except for these
two subsystems (Implic and Prop), the model, in its most basic
form, also includes Source and Sink, which reﬂect the perceptual
processing and response systems respectively, see Figure 3.
Implic and Prop process qualitatively distinct types of mean-
ing. Implicationalmeaning, is holistic, abstract and schematic, and
is where affect is represented and experienced (Barnard, 1999).
Propositional meaning is classically “rational,” being based upon
propositional representation and captures referentially speciﬁc
semantic properties and relationships. The exchanges between two
levels of meaning reﬂect distributed executive functions, rather
than a centralized executive control system, which might suffer
from a homunculus problem.
There is signiﬁcant evidence that a good deal of human seman-
tic processing relies upon propositionally impoverished represen-
tations. It is this evidence that gives the clearest justiﬁcation for
the existence of a distinct implicational level of meaning. In par-
ticular, semantic errors make clear that sometimes we only have
(referentially non-speciﬁc) semantic gist information available to
us, e.g., false memories (Roediger and McDermott, 1995) and the
Moses illusion (Erickson and Mattson, 1981). With respect to the
latter, when comprehending sentences, participants often miss a
semantic inconsistency if it does not dramatically conﬂict with the
gist of the sentence, e.g., in a Noah speciﬁc sentence, such as “How
many animals of each kind did Moses take into the Ark?” most
people respond “two” even though, when questioned, they know
that the relevant biblical character was really Noah rather than
Moses. Substitution of Moses for Noah often fails to be noticed,
while substitution with Nixon, or even Adam, is noticed. This is
presumably because both Moses and Noah ﬁt the generic (impli-
cational) schema “aged male biblical ﬁgure,” but Nixon and Adam
do not.
In addition, Gaillard et al. (2006) reported that in a subliminal
priming study, semantic gist information was available even when
participants failed to correctly name masked emotional words.
Speciﬁcally, in error, words semantically related to target words
were often reported (e.g., target “war,” response “danger”; tar-
get “bomb,” response “death”). This suggests the availability of
implicational meaning and the absence of veridical propositional
meaning. In addition, deep dyslexia (Coltheart et al., 1987), in
which sufferers generate incorrect referents (e.g., reading “lion” as
“tiger”), can be regarded as a marker of broadly intact extraction
of implicational meaning and signiﬁcantly impaired attribution
of referentially more stringent propositional meaning.
To tie this into the previous section, the implicational and
propositional subsystems perform their corresponding salience
assessments as items pass through them in the pipeline. We will
talk in terms of the overall delay-line and subsystem delay-lines.
The former of which describes the complete end-to-end pipeline,
from the visual to the response subsystem, while the latter is used
to describe the portion of the overall pipeline passing through a
component subsystem, e.g., the propositional delay-line.
Serial allocation of attention
Our third principle is a mechanism of attentional engagement
and cognitive control. It is only when attention is engaged at a
subsystem that it can assess the salience of items passing through
it. Furthermore, attention can only be engaged at one subsystem
at a time. Consequently, semantic processes cannot glance at an
incoming item, while looking at and scrutinizing another. This
constraint will play an important role in generating a blink in our
models.
When attention is engaged at a subsystem, we say that it is
buffered (Barnard, 1999). In the context of this paper, the term
buffer refers to a moving focus of attention. Thus, salience assign-
ment can only be performed if the subsystem is buffered and only
one subsystem can be buffered at a time. The buffer mechanism
ensures that the central attentional resources are allocated serially,
while data representations pass concurrently, in the sense that all
FIGURE 3 |Top-level structure of the glance–look model with Implic attended (buffered).
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data representations throughout the overall delay-line are moved
on one place every 20ms.
Each subsystem assigns salience on the basis of the constituent
representations entering it. Salience assignment is performed at
the delay-line of the subsystem when it is buffered. As explained
previously, an item (i.e., a word) in RSVP is composed of several
constituent representations, six in the current simulation. Thus,
the semantic meaning of a word builds up gradually through time.
A subsystem accesses themeaning of a word by looking across sev-
eral of its constituent representations. We assume the meaning of
a word emerges from the ﬁrst few representations. It is important
to point out that we are not talking about letter by letter read-
ing here, but the whole word forming an image that builds up
gradually through time.
In relation to the time course associated with the extraction of
meaning, we assume that three constituent time slots, amounting
to 60ms of presentation, are required for the extraction of use-
ful meaning. Such an estimate is consistent with early research
showing that the number of items reportable from a visual array
rises rapidly with exposures up to 50ms, and plateaus thereafter
(Mackworth, 1963). A 60-ms integration time also equates closely
with a ﬁnding recently reported by Grill-Spector and Kanwisher
(2005). They show not only that detection increases with exposure
durations up to 68ms, but also that at exactly the time point that
the simple detection of an object approximates maximum per-
formance, the ability to report its category also approximates its
maximal level, indicating that accurate generic semantic informa-
tion can indeed be available on the same time scale as simple
detection. Thus, the glance–look model speciﬁes not just how
attention relates to meaning and salience, but also the time course
of meaning formation.
HOW THE MODEL BLINKS
The general idea that attention deployment is governed by an
initial glance at generic meaning and then optionally pursued by
moredetailed scrutinyof referentially speciﬁc propositionalmean-
ing, is captured here by two stages of buffering with distributed
control. The subsystem that is buffered decides when the buffer
moves and where it moves to. In real life situations, stimuli do not
arrive as rapidly as inAB experiments, so Implic and Propwill nor-
mally interpret the representation of the same item or event for an
extended period. However, in laboratory situations, such as RSVP,
items may fail to be implicationally processed as the buffer moves
between subsystems. The buffer movement dynamic provides the
underlying mechanism for the blink as follows.
• When in response to the key-distractor being found to be impli-
cationally salient the buffer moves from Implic to Prop, salience
assessment cannot be performed on a set of words (i.e., a
portion of the RSVP stream) entering Implic following the key-
distractor. Hence, when these implicationally un-interpreted
words are passed to Prop, propositional meaning, which builds
upon coherent detection of implicational meaning, cannot be
accessed. If a target word falls within this window, it will not be
detected as implicationally salient and thus will not be reported.
• There is normally lag-1 sparing in key-distractor AB
experiments, i.e., a target word immediately following the
key-distractor is likely to be reported. This arises in our model
because buffer movement takes time, hence, the word imme-
diately following the key-distractor may be implicationally
interpreted before the buffer moves to Prop.
• When faced with an implicationally un-interpreted item, Prop
is no longer able to assign salience and the buffer has to return
to Implic to assess implicational meaning. Then, Implic assigns
salience to its constituent representations again. After this, tar-
gets entering the system will be detected as implicationally and
propositionally salient and thus will be reported. Hence, the
blink recovers.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this section, we will demonstrate how key-distractors can
capture attention through time, causing semantically prescribed
targets to be missed. In addition, our model interfaces with statis-
tical learning theories of meaning to demonstrate how attentional
capture is modulated by the semantic salience of the eliciting key-
distractor. In the course of this illustration, we will provide a con-
crete account of performance in the key-distractor AB paradigm
where, as just discussed, attention is captured bymeaning. The key
principles that underlie this account are the division of the pro-
cessing across two types of meaning, derived from the previously
highlighted distinction made in the ICS architecture, between a
generic formof meaning referred to as implicationalmeaning, and
propositional meaning, which is referentially speciﬁc (Teasdale
and Barnard, 1993).
METHODS
Modeling task set by semantic similarity
Barnard et al. (2004) used LSA (Landauer and Dumais, 1997;
Landauer et al., 1998, 2007) to assess similarities between key-
distractors and job targets. LSA is a statistical learning method,
which inductively uses the co-occurrence of words in texts and
principal component analysis to build a (compact) multidimen-
sional representation of word meaning. In particular, an “objec-
tive” measure of the semantic distance between a pair of words
or between a word and a pool of words can be extracted from
LSA. The critical ﬁnding of Barnard et al. was an informal obser-
vation that the depth of the blink induced by a key-distractor was
modulated by its proximity to the target category, i.e., its semantic
salience. We seek here to build from this informal understanding
to reproduce in a formal model the key effect of modulation of
attentional capture by semantic salience and to explain that effect,
again formally, using LSA.
Our model also reﬂects gradations in semantic salience. We
assume that the human cognitive system has a space of seman-
tic similarity available to it comparable to that derived from LSA.
The link between principal component analysis (which is at the
heart of LSA) and Hebbian learning (O’Reilly and Munakata,
2000),which remains themost biologically plausible learning algo-
rithm, provides support for this hypothesis. Accordingly, we have
characterized the assessment of semantic salience in terms of LSA.
To encapsulate the target category in LSA space, we identiﬁed
ﬁve pools of words, for respectively, human relatedness, occupa-
tion relatedness, payment relatedness, household relatedness, and
nature relatedness. Then, we calculated the center of each pool in
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LSA space. We reasoned that the target category could be identi-
ﬁed relative to these ﬁve semantic meanings (i.e., pool centers);
see Appendix. This process can be seen as part of a more general
categorization mechanism that works on all LSA dimensions. In
the context of this experiment, it focuses on the ﬁve most strongly
related components, as discussed above.
Next, we needed to determine the signiﬁcance that the human
system placed on proximity to each of these ﬁve meanings when
making target category judgments. To do this, we trained a two-
layer neural network to make what amounts to a “targetness”
judgment from LSA distances (i.e., cosines) to each of the ﬁve
meanings, cf. Figure 4. Speciﬁcally, we trained a single response
node using theDelta rule (O’Reilly andMunakata, 2000) to classify
targets from non-targets. The words used in Barnard et al.’s (2004)
experiment were used as the training patterns. During training, for
each target word, the ﬁve corresponding LSA distances were paired
with an output (i.e., response node activation) of one, while the
LSA distances for non-target words were paired with an output of
zero. This analysis generated ﬁve weights: one for each LSA dis-
tance. These weights effectively characterize the signiﬁcance that
the target salience check ascribes to each of the ﬁve constituent
meanings; thereby, skewing LSA space as required by implicational
salience assessment, cf. Appendix.
Activation of our neural network response unit (denoted m in
Figure 4) becomes the Implic salience assessment decision axis
in our model. Thus, words that generate response unit activation
above a prescribed threshold were interpreted as implicationally
salient,whilewords generating activation below the thresholdwere
interpreted as unsalient.
Parameter setting and multi-level modeling
Some parameters in our model are justiﬁed by neurophysiology,
but others need to be set according to the human data observed in
AB experiments. There are three sets of such parameters that are
ﬁtted using the behavioral curves: (1) salient assignment thresh-
old at Implic; (2) the delay of buffer movement between Implic
and Prop; and (3) the length of delay-lines in all subsystems.
We ﬁt these parameters using a multi-level approach (Su et al.,
2007), which takes inspiration from the computer science notion
of reﬁnement. In the computational modeling of a particular cog-
nitive phenomenon, themodel development process can start with
an abstract black-box analysis of the observable behavior aris-
ing from the phenomenon. For example, with the modeling of
FIGURE 4 | A neural network that integrates five LSA cosines to
classify targets from non-targets.
psychological phenomena, this may amount to a characterization
of the pattern of stimulus–response data using a minimum of
assumptions. Then, from this solid foundation, one could develop
increasingly reﬁned and concrete models, in a progression toward
white-box models. Importantly though, this approach enables
cross abstraction level validation, showing, for example, that the
white-box model is correctly related to the black-box model, i.e.,
in computer science terms, is related by reﬁnement (Bowman and
Gomez, 2006).
A central, and as yet largely unresolved, research question is
how to gain the beneﬁt of contained well-founded modeling in
the context of structurally detailed descriptions on the one hand,
and on the other hand, avoid the “irrelevant speciﬁcation problem”
(Newell, 1990). This problem is classically viewed as arising when
a large number of assumptions are made during model imple-
mentation, such that it is unclear what assumptions correspond to
known cognitive behavior. We provide an initial step in the direc-
tion of developing a progressive multi-level approach to cognitive
modeling. In particular, all levels of ourmodels occupy just part of
the full trajectory of cognitive models (in particular, we regard the
glance–look model as the white-box model, and will not consider
the neural level). In addition, the relationships between levels that
we highlight will be rather speciﬁc and will not be supported by
formal reasoning. More complete instantiations of our method-
ological proposal awaits further computational theoretic work on
how to relate the sorts of models developed in the cognitivemodel-
ing setting. The actual parameter setting and descriptions of black-
to gray- and then towhite-boxmodelingwe explained inAppendix
in order to make the main body more accessible for readers.
RESULTS
Simulation of the glance–lookmodel has shown that high salience
key-distractorsweremuchmore likely to generate above-threshold
response unit activation than low salience items. This in turn
ensured that HS items were more often judged to be implica-
tionally salient, which ensured that the buffer moved from Implic
to Prop more often for HS items. Since the blink deﬁcit is caused
by such buffer movement, targets following HS items were more
likely to be missed, cf. Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that in the context of Barnard et al.’s (2004) key-
distractor blink task, attention is captured when a key-distractor
is interpreted as implicationally salient and thus, in error, task rel-
evant. This then causes attention (i.e., the buffer) to be redeployed
to the propositional subsystem, in order to enable a more detailed
(propositional) assessment of the salience of the key-distractor.
Critically, this redeployment of attention leaves a temporal win-
dow in which implicational salience is not assessed. During this
redeployment, the system is vulnerable to missing even highly
salient items. It is through this mechanism that the model blinks.
This instantiates the idea (Barnard and Bowman, 2003; Barnard
et al., 2004) that semantic blink effects are mediated by ﬁrst glanc-
ing at a form of meaning that supports a sense of relevance in the
task context and thenmoving to amore stringent evaluation of the
extent to which word meaning matches the referentially speciﬁc
properties required by the task.
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FIGURE 5 |Target report accuracy by serial position comparing human
data (Barnard et al., 2004) and model simulation for both high and low
salient key-distractors. Lag indicates the number of items intervening
between the key-distractor and the target.
In addition, we have provided a further case study for the util-
ity of LSA as a means of modeling word meanings. Although the
LSA space did not furnish a direct route to distinguishing high
and low salience key-distractors, a weighted sum of ﬁve attributes
did model generic meaning and we established empirically that
this could form a basis for discriminating our key-distractors. The
effectiveness of LSA depends on the appropriateness of the cor-
pora used to derive the semantic space employed (Landauer et al.,
1998). Nevertheless, we have shown that measures of semantic
distance derived from LSA, which we take as a useful approxi-
mation of implicational salience assessment, can reproduce the
key-distractor blink and semantic modulations of blink depth.
This model has its origins in work on emotional disorders (e.g.,
see Teasdale, 1999 for an extended discussion). In this respect, the
broader mode of processing meaning bears some resemblance to
recent suggestions from the experimental literature that emotion,
body-state, and task manipulations can modulate blink effects
(Barnard et al., 2005; Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Arend
et al.,2006;Arnell et al., 2007).Wenextmove tomodel these effects.
EXPERIMENT 2
There are now several reports of speciﬁc effects of affective vari-
ables during the AB (e.g., Arnell et al., 2007 and Barnard et al.,
2005). In particular, (Anderson, 2005) has shown that the blink is
markedly attenuated when the second target is an aversive word.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the perspective that emotions
have a major inﬂuence on salience sensitive control. Accordingly,
the interaction between emotional salience and temporal attention
is being actively investigated in theAB literature. Consequently,we
have incorporated emotional salience into the glance–lookmodel.
We have particularly focused on modeling the effect of emotional
stimuli in two data sets collected using Barnard’s key-distractorAB
tasks. Similarly to the previous section, in these tasks, participants
search an RSVP stream of words for an item in a target category.
Again, performance on the target identiﬁcation task is investigated
as a function of the lag that the target item appears relative to a
key-distractor. However, rather than being semantically salient, in
these tasks, the key-distractor is emotionally charged.
METHODS
Modeling intrinsic salience due to affect
Arnell et al. (2007) have reported a characteristic blink effect when
the key-distractors are emotionally charged words. Speciﬁcally,
sexual words captured attention more signiﬁcantly than mildly
threatening, anxiety-related, or other emotional words. A deeper
blink occurs in the sexual key-distractor condition than control
conditions, see Figure 7. In addition, sexual words were better
encoded as reﬂected by heightened performance in a subsequent
memory test. This effect suggests that stimulus emotionality is
a cue of intrinsic salience used by cognitive control. In partic-
ular, perception of high priority emotionally salient stimuli can
override the task ﬁlter, in this case a speciﬁc set of target words
deﬁned by semantic category. There is also neurobiological evi-
dence that supports the modulation of cognitive control by affect.
For instance, patients with damage to speciﬁc emotional centers
in the brain (unilateral damage to the left Amygdala) show no dif-
ferential effect to aversive compared to emotionally neutral words
(Anderson and Phelps, 2001). The implication is that this region
plays a central role in the pathway by which affect-driven salience
is assessed.
Arnell et al. (2007) has argued that it is the arousal, rather than
valence, of these key-distractors that correlates with the reduced
accuracy in target identiﬁcation. In particular, the participants’
accuracy of reporting the targets reduced signiﬁcantly when key-
distractors were taboo words. In order, then, to model attentional
capture by emotional words, in particular “tabooness,” in the con-
text of LSA, we have identiﬁed 10 reference words that we view as
representing a schema of a taboo–sexual condition; see Appen-
dix. The choice of these 10 reference words is inspired by Jay
(2009), which has addressed the utility and ubiquity of taboo
words in the context of how they carry emotional information
and what makes these words taboo. Our reference words do not
occur as key-distractors in Arnell’s experiments, but most of them
(or their synonyms) are used in Jay’s article for deﬁningwhat taboo
words are.
We calculated the semantic distance in LSA space between each
of Arnell et al.’s (2007) key-distractors (from both the arousal and
control conditions) and the pool of (reference) taboo deﬁning
words. The high arousal key-distractors had the largest simi-
larity to these reference words, while control condition words
showed minimal similarity to the reference pool; see Appendix.
Our glance–look model can thus be extended to describe both
semantic and emotional salience by computing the semantic sim-
ilarity of each word to the target set as well as the taboo deﬁning
references. We assume that if any of these dimensions has reached
a certain threshold, the implicational subsystem will regard the
item as salient, and trigger the buffer to move to the propositional
subsystem. As a result of this, both task relevant and intrinsic
emotionally salient key-distractors can cause the system to blink.
Modeling intrusion of body-state markers
Barnard et al. (2005) has shown another way in which emotion
could interfere with cognitive control. The main ﬁnding in this
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study was that although the threatening key-distractors do not
capture attention of unselected participants as they did in Arnell
et al. (2007), they can capture attentionwith participants that were
both high state and high trait anxious. In addition, consistent with
the notion that this phenomenon is not identical to that identiﬁed
by Arnell et al. (2007) the blink exhibited in Barnard et al. (2005)
was speciﬁcally late and short, cf. Figure 8 solid lines (where it
is only at lag-4 that the high state and high trait anxious group
differs signiﬁcantly from the low sate anxious group). State anx-
iety is deﬁned as transitory anxiety experienced at a particular
time (often in the recent past or during the experiment). On the
other hand, trait anxiety refers to a more general and long-term
experience of anxiety; and it often reﬂects individual differences
in reaction to threat (Spielberger, 1972, 1983).
Consistent with the ICS framework, this attentional capture
by threat was modeled through the addition of a body-state sub-
system, cf. Figure 6. It is assumed that the body-state subsystem
responds to the glance at meaning, i.e., to implicational meaning.
A bodily evaluation of salience is then fed-back to Implic; thereby,
enriching the representation. In effect, the body-state feeds back
information in the form of a “somatic marker” (Damasio, 1994;
Bechara et al., 2000), which, in the context of the task being con-
sidered here, would be a threat marker. Another assumption is
that the body-state representation is built upon the implicational
meaning with a delay, so the blink onset is positively shifted as
shown in Figure 8. Huang et al. (2008) have demonstrated in
a series of AB experiments with different task instructions, that
emotional key-distractors only generate an AB if the task involves
semantic judgments rather than more surface tasks, such as those
based on visual features, rhyming patterns, or phonological cues.
This evidence also suggests that emotional and body-state rep-
resentations are activated in the processing of (implicational)
meaning.
In addition, it is assumed that high anxiety levels (both state and
trait) are required before this body-state feedback has sufﬁcient
strength to have a major effect on implicational salience. Such
difference in sensitivity to affect between high and low anxious
individuals is supported by neurophysiological ﬁndings (fMRI,
Bishop et al., 2004). In their experiment, both high and low anx-
ious people showed increased amygdala activation for fearful faces
vs. neutral faces when the faces were attended. However, when
the faces were unattended, only high anxious participants showed
increased amygdala activation for fearful faces vs. neutral faces.
This suggests that for high state and high trait anxious individu-
als, threatening key-distractors are implicationally interpreted as
highly salient when body-state feedback enhances their implica-
tional representation. This enhanced representation precipitates a
detailed “look” at the meaning of these items by initiating a buffer
move to Prop. Any new items, in particular targets, that arrive at
Implic while the buffer is at Prop will be missed. However, since
threatening key-distractors are not semantically salient, the buffer
will move swiftly back to Implic and the blink is restricted in its
length and depth. (In Arnell et al.’s (2007) experiment, although
taboo words are not semantically salient, they are emotionally
exceptionally salient, so the buffer does not move back to Implic
faster than normal).
RESULTS
Without changing the model parameters set in Experiment 1,
but by simply introducing the additional dimension of emotion
salience, simulations of the glance–lookmodel indeed reproduced
the emotional AB phenomena in Experiment 2. For example, as
shown in Figure 7 dashed lines, the model reproduced a deeper
blink for arousal (sexual-related) but not neutral key-distractors.
In addition, as shown in Figure 8 dashed lines, the model gener-
ated a characteristic late and short blink at around lag-4, which
is uniquely observed in Barnard et al. (2005). In summary, the
glance–look model has effectively broadened classical notions of
task ﬁltering that, in a wider sense, should embrace affect and
body-state.
FIGURE 6 |The glance–look model extended with body-state subsystem.
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FIGURE 7 |Target report accuracy by serial position comparing human
data (Arnell et al., 2007) and model simulation for arousal
sexual-related and neutral key-distractors.
FIGURE 8 |Target report accuracy by serial position comparing human
data (Barnard et al., 2005) and model simulations for high state and
high trait anxious and low state anxious.
DISCUSSION
In this section,we havemodeled emotional effects on theAB using
the glance–lookmodel. By reproducing twokey experimental ﬁnd-
ings, we have proposed two distinct mechanisms by which affect
may play a critical role in guiding temporal attention. The ﬁrst
mechanism takes a direct path, by which affect directly increases
the salience of the stimuli to such a degree that control is rede-
ployed from monitoring generic meaning to the more speciﬁc
referential meaning. Hence, we see a somewhat classic blink curve
as observed by Arnell et al. (2007). The second mechanism is via
the body-state feedback loop, bywhich affect can inﬂuence cognitive
control as seen in Barnard et al. (2005). These two mechanisms
may occur simultaneously, but body-state feedback often has a
delay of several hundred milliseconds. Hence, we argue that in
Arnell et al. (2007), the body-state feedback arrives too late to
affect the shifting of attention because the buffer has already com-
mitted to move from Implic to Prop. Thus, the effect of body-state
feedback on cognitive control may only become important when
the salience of emotional stimuli is not sufﬁcient to trigger the
buffer to move from Implic to Prop. We argue that this is the case
in Barnard et al. (2005). Indeed, in high anxious individuals with
hyperactive body-state subsystems, body-state feedback (although
arriving with a delay) may still enhance the salience of the item
sufﬁciently to trigger the buffer to move. Indeed, the glance–look
model has reproduced the delayed blink curve in Barnard et al.
(2005).
Although the focus of our modeling is the time course of blink
onset, which is the key to distinguishing these two mechanisms
of affective control, i.e., via the direct path (Arnell et al., 2007)
or body-state feedback loop (Barnard et al., 2005), we have also
noticed other differences between these two types of emotional
effects in the AB. First, lag-1 sparing is markedly weaker in the
taboo key-distractor condition compared to its control condi-
tions, cf. Arnell et al. (2007) and classic semantic AB blink curves.
Although not formally modeled in this paper, we argue that this
may result from a faster reconﬁguration when stimuli are excep-
tionally salient. In particular, the very presence of extreme taboo
words and knowledge that they have a high likelihood of recurring
in this task contextmay bias a rapid shift of attention toward them.
The glance–look model predicts such reduced lag-1 sparing when
the buffer movement delay from Implic to Prop is sampled from
a negatively shifted distribution, i.e., the buffer moves faster from
Implic to Prop. Such a shortened delay when switching attentional
focus may leave a shorter window of time for the lag-1 item to
be implicationally processed. This would lower the probability of
reporting targets that immediately follow the key-distractor. There
are plausible neurobiological mechanisms that may support such
rapid orientation toward threatening stimuli. One of the most
prominent theories is the fast sub-cortical route for emotion, pro-
posed by LeDoux et al. (1986), LeDoux (1996). They showed, in a
fear conditioning paradigm, that there exists a direct route between
thalamus and amygdale, bypassing the cortex.
Second, the blink is shorter in Barnard et al. (2005) than in
Arnell et al. (2007). As previously discussed, this is modeled by a
reduced buffer movement delay from Prop to Implic when Prop is
processing mildly threatening words. However, it is unlikely to be
the case when participants are processing extremely salient taboo
words. Theynot only rapidly capture our attention,but also engage
extensively before releasing the control and allowing the buffer to
return to Implic. Thus, the glance–look model naturally mimics
our subjective experience of taboo words.
In summary, the glance–look model supports a broader per-
spective on cognitive and affective control. In particular, it has
moved toward a schematic and embodied account by introducing a
gist-based implicational subsystem,which is sensitive tobody-state
feedback. In this sense, it broadens classical theories of cognitive
control. When moving to such a perspective of cognitive con-
trol, some commonly considered distinctions become somewhat
undermined. For example, the difference between endogenous
(top-down) salience and exogenous (bottom-up) salience is not as
clear-cut as commonly considered. That is, the distinction between
a stimulus that is viewed as salient on the basis of top-down inﬂu-
ences (e.g., the ink color red when color-naming in a Stroop task)
and on the basis of bottom-up inﬂuences (e.g., a threatening word
when color-naming during an emotional Stroop task) is really
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a distinction between salience prescribed by the experimenter
(endogenous) and salience prescribed by the participant’s longer-
term goals (exogenous). Thus, both endogenous and exogenous
reﬂect biases on stimulus processing due to organism goals, and,
in that sense, are both top-down, it is simply that in the endoge-
nous case, goals are short-term and artiﬁcially enforced, while
in the exogenous case, goals are long-term and intrinsic to the
organism.
EXPERIMENT 3
Recent ﬁndings also suggest beneﬁcial effects of focusing on
schematic and gist-based implicational meaning when the atten-
tional system is under high cognitive load. Two important ﬁndings
support this view.One is the fringe awareness phenomenon shown
in the key-distractor AB, cf. (Barnard et al., 2004), where some
level of awareness is preserved during the AB while full refer-
ential identity is apparently absent. There is also evidence for a
counterintuitive pattern, in which distracting participants can in
fact reduce blink depth (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006;
Arend et al., 2006). Thus, in this context, reducing attentional
focus seems to improve awareness. It has been argue that such
distraction may counteract an overinvestment of attention. To
elaborate further, in a typical laboratory setting, participants are
encouraged to recall as accurately as possible. As previously argued
by several authors (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Arend
et al., 2006), this couldwell, in a very broad informal sense, result in
more“investment of attention” than is strictly necessary to accom-
plish item report. Hence, task manipulations and emotional states
(e.g., by using music, positive affect, or dynamic visual patterns)
can attenuate blink effects (i.e., enhance awareness of the second
target) by, it is argued, encouraging a more distributed state of
attention. This section shows how the glance–lookmodel can pro-
vide a more formal information processing account for the fringe
awareness and overinvestment ﬁndings in the AB. In addition,
we argue for a re-evaluation of conventional theories of cognitive
function based on interactions between attention, emotion, and
consciousness.
METHODS
Modeling fringe awareness in the attentional blink
As previously discussed, Barnard et al. (2004) used three types of
response in their AB experiments: (1) report of the target identity,
(2) “No job seen,” and (3) “Yes, I saw a job, but could not report its
identity.” These responses reﬂect different degrees of awareness of
target presence. The glance–look model suggests that the salience
assignment of a target word can also be processed to three different
degrees, cf. Table 1. We argue that different degrees of processing
can potentially result in different types of response.
As shown in theﬁrst rowofTable 1, targets that are found salient
both at Prop and Implic can be reported correctly with their iden-
tity at the endof the sequence.As previously discussed,a subsystem
needs to evaluate at least three constituent representations in order
to access the salience of a word. In the second situation in Table 1,
some items may be implicationally un-interpreted because Implic
is not buffered when they are passed through the implicational
delay-line. The model assumes that implicationally unprocessed
items will not be evaluated for meaning at the propositional level.
Table 1 | Different degrees of processing and their corresponding
responses from the model.
Implicational subsystem Propositional subsystem Responses
Fully processed Fully processed Correct report of
identity
Unprocessed Unprocessed “No” responses
Partially processed Any level of processing “Yes” responses
Our model predicts that this will result in a situation where sub-
jects are completely unaware of the presence of an incoming item,
andwill respond“no”at the endof the trial. Finally, as shownby the
third situation in Table 1, some targets can be partially processed
by Implic, but only for less than three constituent representations.
Hence, we argue that when executive processes are reconﬁguring,
participants could be only fringe aware of salient stimuli.Although
lacking the full referential identity, they are capable of reacting to
at least some categorical information. This further suggests that
gist-based implicational meaning may contribute to awareness of
stimuli without extended propositional processing.
Modeling attenuation effects in the attentional blink
Given the existence of fringe awareness based on semantic “gist,”
the next question is whether schematic (implicational) represen-
tations alone are sufﬁcient to identify items in RSVP streams
when the capacity of the system is being pushed toward its limit,
i.e., when there are distractions. Here, we model attenuation
effects using the glance–look model and, thereby, provide a com-
putational account of the overinvestment theory. In particular,
overinvestment may reﬂect (functionally unnecessary) extended
processing in our second propositional stage, delaying attention’s
return to a state in which implicational representations are eval-
uated. The implicational mode of attending to meaning has a
broader focus on generic meaning, which we argue incorporates
affect, and derivatives of multimodal or lower order inputs, such
as music. When participants are exposed to dynamic patterns,
being visual, musical, or internally generated, while performing
the central AB task, there would be more changes in input to
Implic. With our model of distributed control, these may well
encourage the implicational mode of attending to meaning, per-
haps “calling” the buffer back from Prop to Implic, and, thus,
supporting more distributed awareness of this type of generic
meaning.
The degree of, distraction-induced, attenuation reported in
Arend et al. (2006), Olivers and Nieuwenhuis (2005, 2006) should,
though, reﬂect two factors: the degree to which the ancillary task
has direct consequences for the representation of generic (impli-
cational)meaning and the extent to which the reporting of an item
requires extended evaluation of propositionalmeanings. Crucially,
when attenuation effects are observed, the paradigmoften involves
reporting letters in a background stream of digits (Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006; Arend et al., 2006). Letters are drawn
from a small and highly familiar set, and hence, in the limit, may
require only the briefest “look” at a propositional representation,
or in most cases, only a “glance” at the implicational representa-
tion, to support correct report. So,we assume in themodel that the
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buffermoves from Implic to Propwith a reduced probability when
participants are distracted. And, we also assume that the majority
of items can be reported when they have only been implicational
processed.
RESULTS
As seen in Figure 9A, the glance–look model has reproduced the
“No” response, which often occurs at serial position 3 and 4. And,
these lags are the deepest points of the blink. Using the same
parameter setting, our model generated partial processing at serial
position 2, because it is the moment when the buffer is shifting
from Implic to Prop. At this serial position, human participants
often respond with “yes,” conﬁrming that they are aware of the
presence of the target but unable to identify it, cf.Figure 9B.Hence,
the glance–look model naturally captures the fringe awareness.
Finally, the glance–look model also reproduced the attenuation
effects, cf. Figure 10. Due to limitation of space, we only show the
simulation result for Experiment 1 of Olivers and Nieuwenhuis
(2005), in which the blink depth reduced when participants had
additional tasks.
DISCUSSION
The glance–look model has shown that lack of awareness can be
accounted for by the allocation of attention to different levels of
FIGURE 9 | Proportion of (A) “No” response and (B) “Yes” response
(i.e., reflecting partial awareness) by serial position comparing human
data (Barnard et al., 2004) and model simulation for high and low
salient key-distractors.
meaning in a system where there is only distributed control of
processing activity. Just as the focus of our attention may shift
among entities in our visual and auditory scenery under the guid-
ance of salient change, shifts in attention to different entities in our
semantic scenery can lead to RSVP targets being either, (1) cor-
rectly identiﬁed; (2) “noticed” with fringe awareness of presence;
or (3) overlooked. Salience states at each of two levels of mean-
ing allow these three response patterns to be captured. Although
the proposal, like that of Chun and Potter (1995), relies on two
stages, both of our stages are semantic in nature and the tempo-
ral dynamic involves controlled changes in the focus of attention,
rather than classic capacity or resource limitations. The idea of
monitoring a generic form of meaning for implicational salience,
the level at which affect is represented in the model, and switching
only when required to evaluate propositional meaning, represent
two “modes” of attending to meaning. The former mode has a
broader focus on generic meaning (i.e., the “gist”) and the latter a
more evaluative focus on speciﬁc meanings, which can be verbally
reported. This is similar to the distinction in the literature between
“phenomenal” and “access” awareness (Lamme, 2003). Further-
more, the broadermode of processingmeaning bears some resem-
blance to recent suggestions that task manipulations can attenuate
blink effects, by encouraging a more distributed state of aware-
ness, which would arise at our implicational level. In particular,
music, positive affect, and dynamic visual patternsmay counteract
on overinvestment of attention (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2005,
2006; Arend et al., 2006) and produce a ﬂeeting conscious percept
(Crick and Koch, 2003).
In summary, consciousness is modeled as an emergent prop-
erty from the interaction among three subsystems: implicational,
propositional, and body-state. In particular, we differentiate two
types of consciousness. One is akin to full “access” awareness, i.e.,
conscious content can be verbally reported, and is supported by
both implicational and propositional processing. In other words,
it is a result of a detailed “look” and more extensive mental pro-
cessing. The other is akin to “phenomenal” (or fringe) awareness.
We argue that the latter is a result of attending to the implicational
FIGURE 10 |Target report accuracy by serial position comparing human
data (Olivers and Nieuwenhuis, 2006) and model simulation for with
and without distraction, i.e., an additional task.
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level or “glance.” It is also notable that the implicational level is
holistic, abstract and schematic, and is where multimodal inputs
are integrated, and affect is represented and experienced (Barnard,
1999).
In addition, the glance–look model makes several predictions
on the relationship between these two modes of consciousness.
First, fringe awareness provides a basis for a more complete state
of consciousness. Second, comparing to full access awareness, phe-
nomenal, or fringe awareness is directly affected by emotional,
multimodal, body-state, and lower order inputs. However, once
propositional level information has been attended, a conscious
percept is much less likely to be interrupted. The validation of
these predictions awaits further experimental work.
The model however also predicts that attenuation should be
less pronounced either with secondary tasks whose content does
not directly inﬂuence the level of generic (implicational) mean-
ing or, as with semantic blink effects, where a fuller evaluation of
propositional meanings is required. Should such effects be found,
it would provide an encouraging convergence between basic labo-
ratory tasks and the literature on attention to meaning and affect
in emotional disorders, using a non-computationally speciﬁed
version of our current proposal (Teasdale, 1999).
GENERAL CONCLUSION
We started this paper with the observation that, as classically for-
mulated and empirically studied, cognitive control has been rather
narrowly delineated. In particular, studies have typically focused
exclusively on the cognitive and on experimental materials that
afford a precise discrete demarcation into task relevant and non-
task relevant. One might, indeed, describe this as an all-or-none
circumscription of task-focus: stimuli are either completely goal
relevant or completely goal irrelevant. This problem is being par-
tially addressed by a body of emerging cognitive control research
that incorporates the affect dimension, the journal special topic
that this paper is presented under being a case in point. Indeed,
there is now a good deal of evidence that, even when task irrele-
vant, affect laden stimuli bias attentional focus and are prioritized
(Anderson, 2005; Barnard et al., 2005; Arnell et al., 2007).
The other pillar of our argument to broaden the notion of
goal-relevance, and which certainly remains underexplored, is the
role of meaning representations (in their broadest sense) in cog-
nitive control. Firstly, the space of meaning representations that
the brain carries is likely to be inherently continuous and graded.
This certainly is, for example, the perspective arising from statis-
tical learning techniques, both in their supervised (O’Reilly and
Munakata, 2000) and unsupervised (Landauer and Dumais, 1997;
Landauer et al., 1998, 2007) formulations. Thus, it is just difﬁcult
for our brains to perfectly delineate one meaning category from
another. The goal speciﬁcations, that we employ, and which are
surely substantially driven by meaning, are likely to be graded in
nature, rather than discrete.
In this context, we have proposed a model of central exec-
utive function based upon two levels of meaning and, corre-
spondingly, two levels of ﬁltering. The ﬁrst of these, the glance,
extracts a schematic, implicational, representation of meaning;
and it is at this level that affect is encompassed. The second,
the look, assesses a referentially bound propositional perspective
on meaning. Using this framework, we were able to integrate
graded representations of meaning, based upon LSA, with emo-
tional and body-state inﬂuences. We illustrated this model in the
context of the key-distractor AB task. We were able to model
a spectrum of key-distractor AB phenomena, including, modu-
lation of blink depth by key-distractor semantic salience, deep
blink proﬁles with taboo key-distractors, smaller, and later con-
cern associated blinks with milder affective key-distractors, fringe
awareness patterns, and blink attenuation in the presence of
distraction.
In the current trend of cognitive neuroscience, functional MRI
is the primarymethod thatmaps cognitive functions to underlying
neurobiology. However, in the context of AB, the poor tempo-
ral resolution of BOLD functional imaging is not sensitive to the
very rapid switch between Implic and Prop in our glance–look
model. Hence, one must be speculative when relating subsystems
in our model to brain areas. Nonetheless, we argue that mecha-
nisms implemented inourmodel ﬁtwithin existingneuroscientiﬁc
ﬁndings of cognitive and affective networks in human brain. For
example, it is argued that neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC) encode task set (Miller and Cohen, 2001). DLPFC
and parts of the multiple-demand (MD) system (Duncan, 2010)
could be correlated with Prop, where the task ﬁlter derived from
experimental instruction is implemented. It is also argued that
animals have the ability to extract threatening information from
the environment, and such ability is hard-wired through evolu-
tion. Threatening stimuli act as cues of potential danger and may
trigger “ﬂight or ﬁght” responses, so it is important for all animals,
including humans. Hence, threatening information needs to be
rapidly extracted directly from sensory inputs, likely via the neural
pathway from the sensory thalamus to the amygdala (LeDoux,
1996). This is consistent with our glance–look model that emo-
tion induced representations are extracted directly from sensory
inputs at Implic, cf. modeling intrinsic salience due to emotion
in Section “Experiment 2.” In addition, the body representations
encoded in our body-state subsystem are likely to correlate with
somatosensory cortex, insula, and hypothalamus (Bechara et al.,
2005).
Implic as the central subsystem for the integration of cognition
and emotion plays a critical role in the glance–lookmodel account
of cognitive and affective control theory. We believe a number of
candidate regions in the brain are well situated to perform this
function. Firstly, the amygdala is not only highly connected to
both cortical and sub-cortical systems, but also participates in
both cognitive processing, such as attention orientation, and emo-
tional processing (Heller andNitschke, 1997). Secondly, it has been
shown that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the ventromedial pre-
frontal cortex (VMPFC), and the anterior cingulated cortex (ACC)
are also likely to be part of this integration network (Pessoa, 2008).
(Also, see Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2005 for a review of neural
correlates of attention and emotion systems, and for an alternative
computational account for the time course of attentional control
network. It is likely that the glance–look model also draws on
resource in other areas of the brain that are sensitive to functional
MRI. However, to get temporal information in the time frame of
RSVP, time resolved techniques, such asMagnetoencephalography
is highly desirable).
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With respect to the interaction between emotion and cogni-
tion, the general effect of emotion in cognitive control has been
experimentally studied, but related computational theories are
not fully spelled out in the literature. Some successful compu-
tational models of emotion rely on statistical learning algorithms,
e.g., reinforcement learning (Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al.,
1997). Others argue for competition between emotion and cogni-
tive processing (Mathews et al., 1997; Mathews and Mackintosh,
1998; Taylor and Fragopanagos, 2005; Wyble et al., 2008). Our
glance–look model ﬁts within the latter bracket and arguing for
competitive interaction between cognition and emotion, i.e., emo-
tional salience can attract attention and impair (cognitive) task
oriented processing. However, our model speciﬁes how they com-
pete in time, and predicts the complex temporal dynamics of
cognitive and affective control. In addition, our model addresses
the importance of processing at the implicational level.
From an evolutionary perspective, implicational meaning has
its origins in the multimodal control of action (Barnard et al.,
2007). The implicational subsystem, across the human line of
decent, is where overt responses are selected on the basis of a
blending and assessment of external (visual and auditory) and
internal (body-state) stimuli. This is augmented by a proposi-
tional subsystem only in Homo sapiens and hence gives rise to a
unique form of “cognitive” control. In some sense, most current
theories of cognitive control lack a coherent behavioral ground-
ing that goes beyond the fact that we are good at attending
to stimuli that are relevant to what we are doing in intellec-
tual tasks. However, the idea of implicational salience is that it
can deal either with affective or non-affective salience. We argue
that emotional blinks reﬂect “incidental” salience, which is partly
due to processing of implicational meaning and partly due to a
later body-state intervention. For emotional stimuli (speciﬁcally
in the context of AB) there are only minimal requirements to
do a propositional evaluation. So, in some sense, the essence of
“cognitive” control is how much involvement of the propositional
subsystem there is in evaluating representations in relation to
task ﬁlters. Although task demands require a propositional rep-
resentation, the glance–look model evolving here has the basic
elements that enable affect, goals, body-state, and meaning to be
addressed.
The glance–look model’s simulation of blink attenuation with
distraction does prompt an intriguing prediction. The model
explains such attenuation in terms of an over emphasis on propo-
sitional level processing and, in that sense,ﬁtswith over investment
theories of the AB (Taatgen et al., 2007). Importantly, this expla-
nation is highly stimulus and task type dependent. That is, we are
proposing that, in the context of the experimental laboratory, the
cognitive system applies an extensive propositional analysis when
it is, in some cases, not strictly necessary. This level of analysis is
particularly redundant in the context of highly over learnt stimulus
sets that are easily classiﬁed on the basis of surface features at the
implicational system. However, this, at least partial, redundancy of
propositional processing, would not obtain so signiﬁcantly when
semantic salience judgments are being made. Such salience would
particularly obtain in the semantic key-distractor AB tasks con-
sidered in Section “Experiment 1” of this paper. Thus, we predict
that addition of distraction manipulations, such as, background
starﬁeld (Arend et al., 2006), inducing positive affect (Olivers and
Nieuwenhuis, 2005, 2006), and a peripheral task (Taatgen et al.,
2007),would not attenuate the semantic key-distractor blinkwith-
out, at the least, a cost to baseline target report performance. In
other words, in semantic key-distractor tasks, emphasis on propo-
sitional processing is necessary and cannot be subverted without
performance cost.
In addition to testing this pivotal prediction, it would clearly
be beneﬁcial to broaden the application of the glance–look model
beyond theABdomain. Inparticular, itwill be important to test the
model in the context of Stroop and emotional Stroop experiments,
particularly those focused on strategic, typically conﬂict-based,
patterns of behavior (Botvinick et al., 2001; Wyble et al., 2008).
It is also important tonote that the glance–lookmodel is formu-
lated within a broader architectural framework: the ICS architec-
ture (Barnard, 1985). Such broader theories are not now very com-
mon in cognitive neuroscience theory, which has become focused
on rather small scale neural networkmodels of particular cognitive
phenomena. Integrationwithin architectural frameworks, though,
enables higher level macro theoretic constraints to be brought to
bear, such as the macroscopic information ﬂows between com-
ponent subsystems (Barnard, 2004). Such broader perspectives
should enable the undoubtedly extensive and diverse constraints
that impinge on central executive function, and the role affect and
meaning play in that system, to be coherently brought to bear.
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APPENDIX
LATENT SEMANTIC ANALYSIS OF KEY-DISTRACTOR WORDS
Human reference words: human people mankind womankind
someone mortal fellow sentient folk soul.
Occupation reference words: occupation profession job trade
employment work business career livelihood vocation.
Payment reference words: payment fee remuneration recompense
bribe salary honorarium income earnings wages.
Household reference words: ornament device utensil gadget tool
possession decoration ﬁtting ﬁxture furnishing.
Nature reference words: archipelago backwoods beach biosphere
brook channel cliff cloud cloudburst coastline crevasse crevice
cyclone desert diamond drought sediment earthquake eruption
estuary everglades ﬁssure fjord ﬂoodplain frost geyser gorge grass-
land habitat hailstone headwind hillside hoarfrost iceberg ice-
cap inlet island landscape lightning limestone meadow monsoon
moonlight moraine mudﬂats outback outcrop pampas plains
plateau puddle quartz rainbow raindrop rapids reef riverbank
riverbed saltmarsh sandstorm savannah seashore shoreline skyline
snowﬂake straits stream sunshine swamp tempest tornado breeze
tributary causeway waterfall wetlands whirlpool woodland.
Taboo reference words: vulgar offensive feces sex slang slur disgust-
ing taboo blasphemous insulting.
FITTING THE PARAMETERS AND MODEL REFINEMENT
Black-box (Extensionalist) model: ﬁtting the behavior curves with
closed form equations
In the ﬁrst step of the reﬁnement trajectory, we regard the system
as a black-box. That is, no assumptions are made about the inter-
nal structure of the system and there is no decomposition, at all,
of the black-box into its constituent components. Thus, the point
of reference for the modeler is the externally visible behavior, i.e.,
the semantic blink curves (Barnard et al., 2004). Such models are
extensionalist in nature, and they simply characterize the data. A
critical beneﬁt of black-box cognitive modeling is that there are
less degrees of freedom and fewer hidden assumptions, making
data ﬁtting and parameter setting both well-founded and, typi-
cally, computationally tractable. For example, if the system can be
described in closed form, key parameters can be determined by
solving a set of equations, if not, computational search methods
can be applied.
An extensionalist model simply provides a systematic charac-
terization of how data in a domain varies. This technique has been
widely used in modeling response time distributions (Van Zandt,
2000;Cousineau et al., 2004) and,more recently, inmodeling serial
position curves of basic attentional blink tasks (Cousineau et al.,
2006). In our context of exploring the key-distractor attentional
blink task, the behavior curves have sharp blink onsets and shallow
recoveries as shown in Figure 5. This shape matches an inverted
Gamma distribution. Hence, we use the following equation to
model blink curves.










β · ∫∞0 tα−1e−t dt
x ≥μ; α, β> 0
where G is a Gamma distribution, x is the serial position, a sets
the baseline performance, and b describes the difference between
the deepest point of the blink and the baseline. If b is set to 0, the
function models the complete absence of the blink and baseline
performance at all lags. So, we call b the depth parameter or the
capture constant. In particular,b is related to key-distractor salience
and thus characterizes the attentional capture by salience effect we
are interested in. After ﬁtting y to the human blink curves show in
Figure 5, a is set to 0.67 for both high and low salient cases, but b
is 1.8 for high salient key-distractors and 0.8 for low salient ones.
It will become clear later that the capture constant b is related to
implicational salience assignment threshold. Other parameters in
the model (α= 2.2, β= 1.6, μ= 0) were ﬁxed during data ﬁtting,
so, they do not affect the depth of the blink.
Gray-box model: adding assumptions of internal structure
In the black-boxmodel,we used aGamma distribution to describe
the shape of blink curves. However, it does not describe the
underlying mechanism of the cognitive system and what mental
processes are likely to produce the AB phenomenon. In addition,
the black-box model does not set all parameters in the glance–
look model. We have introduced an intermediate step between
black- and white-box models in order to incrementally add com-
plexity. In particular, we set as many parameters as we can, at this
stage, without deﬁning the complex semantic space, which will
be left to the ﬁnal reﬁnement. Hence, the intermediate gray-box
model reﬁnes the black-box model, and reﬂects the three assump-
tions about internal structure explained in Section “Theory of the
Glance-look Model” (i.e., sequential processing, two stages, and
serial allocation of attention).
Salience assignment. In the gray-box model, the salience assign-
ment threshold is indirectly modeled using a parameter called the
intrinsic probability of identiﬁcation (denoted P), which refers to
the probability that an item will be seen if it is presented as a sin-
gle target in an RSVP stream. Note, P(X, Y) is not the probability
that both items X and Y are seen in an AB setting, but rather the
probability that both would individually be seen in two separate
single target events.
The intrinsic probability of detecting a target P(T)= 0.67 is set
by the baseline performance of humans (Barnard et al., 2004). The
intrinsic probability of a background word being implicationally
salient is assumed to be zero, since this sort of error is so rare as
to be effectively zero. The intrinsic probability of detecting a high
and low salient key-distractor is P(HS) and P(LS) respectively.
According to the gray-box model, if the key-distractor is implica-
tional salient and the buffer shifts to Prop, the lag-3 item (i.e., the
deepest point in AB) will always be missed. So, the deepest point
in the blink curve reﬂects the joint probability of missing the key-
distractor and detecting the target, i.e., P(¬HS, T) and P(¬LS, T)
in thehigh and low salient conditions respectively.According to the
behavior curves (Barnard et al., 2004), we set P(¬HS, T)= 0.34
and P(¬LS, T)= 0.54, cf. Figure A1. Assuming Implic assesses
targets and key-distractors independently, we have the following.
P (HS) = 1 − P (¬HS) = 1 − P (¬HS,T)/P (T) = 0.49
P (LS) = 1 − P (¬LS) = 1 − P (¬LS,T)/P (T) = 0.19
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Latent semantic analysis cosines for high salient key-distractors of Barnard et al. (2004).
Human Occupation Payment Household Nature mValue
Heretic 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.087
Raconteur 0 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.031
Volunteer 0.2 0.34 0.16 0.1 0.04 0.438
Opponent 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.05 0.078
Patron 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.11
Coward 0.26 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.11
Pragmatist 0 0.17 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.102
Heathen 0.18 0.07 0 0.14 0.13 0.081
Scoundrel 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.11
Visitor 0.36 0.21 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.226
Grandson 0.21 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.18 0.094
Informant 0.03 0.17 0.03 0 0.07 0.087
Disciple 0.19 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.14
Witness 0.37 0.09 0.07 0.19 0.11 0.277
Voter 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.059
Widow 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.09 0.211
Vegetarian 0.16 0.03 0 0.08 0.06 0.085
Adversary 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.03 0.255
Thinker 0.25 0.13 0 0.07 0.04 0.177
Extrovert 0.14 0.1 0.01 0 0 0.118
Stranger 0.4 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.2 0.181
Visionary 0.21 0.07 0.02 0.11 0.1 0.122
Neighbor 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.07 0.127
Kinsman 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.11 0.127
Hunchback 0.11 0.04 0 0.04 0.01 0.081
Enthusiast 0.16 0.05 0 0.07 0.13 0.051
Accomplice 0.17 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.122
Sweetheart 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.115
Cousin 0.25 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.147
Egghead 0.08 0.04 0 0 0.03 0.059
Admirer 0.24 0.11 0 0.08 0.06 0.153
Spectator 0.16 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.134
Refugee 0.18 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.14
Hooligan 0.05 0.01 0 0.03 0.07 0.027
Shopper 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.13
Savior 0.18 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.07 0.099
Auntie 0.08 0 0 0.05 0.08 0.033
Pedestrian 0.14 0.03 0 0.03 0.03 0.081
Tourist 0.18 0.21 0.08 0.1 0.24 0.13
Husband 0.22 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.261
Hence, the intrinsic probability of identiﬁcation sets the likeli-
hood of an itempassing the salient assignment threshold at Implic.
Although humans perceive information in a noisy environment, so
salient items may be missed, in the current model, to limit degrees
of freedom and obtain a model that is as simple as possible, we
assume that Prop is perfectly accurate in classifying targets from
non-targets.
Buffer movement delay. In the glance–lookmodel, the buffer can
move in two directions, i.e., from Implic to Prop and vice versa.
So, there are two buffer movement parameters D1 and D2, which
denote the delay of buffer movement from Implic to Prop and
vice versa respectively. We also assume that salience assignment
only takes place at the ﬁrst three constituents in a subsystem’s
delay-line. When ﬁtting the delay parameters, lag-1 sparing sets
the lower bound of D1. That is, Implic determines that the buffer
needs tomove if the ﬁrst three constituent representations is impli-
cationally salient, as shown in Figure A2A. In order to report
targets that immediately follow the key-distractor (i.e., the lag-1
case), Implic should process at least three constituent representa-
tions of the lag-1 item, as shown in Figure A2B. Hence,D1 should
be no less than 120ms.
Furthermore, the onset of the blink sets the upper bound of
D1. In order to miss lag-2 targets, D1 must be larger than 220ms.
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Latent semantic analysis cosines for low salient key-distractors of Barnard et al. (2004).
Human Occupation Payment Household Nature mValue
Barometer 0.01 0.03 0 0.12 0.06 0.042
Button 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.3 0.08 0.186
Cabinet 0.09 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.122
Cellophane 0.08 0.04 0 0.14 0.07 0.065
Chandelier 0.1 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.059
Cosmetic 0.07 0.09 0 0.12 0 0.11
Cupboard 0.16 0.05 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.11
Curtain 0.21 0.06 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.099
Deodorant 0.04 0.05 0 0.17 0.03 0.078
Detergent 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.24 0.07 0.078
Dictionary 0.06 0.12 0 0.08 0.02 0.102
Freezer 0.04 0 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.046
Hammer 0.15 0.16 0 0.53 0.13 0.19
Handle 0.21 0.34 0.13 0.57 0.12 0.489
Ladder 0.19 0.29 0.06 0.09 0.18 0.202
Ladle 0.09 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.102
Lantern 0.14 0.1 0 0.08 0.17 0.056
Notepaper 0.09 0 0 0 0.05 0.037
Oven 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.06 0.074
Percolator 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 0.1 0.018
Picture 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.18 0.078
Pillow 0.14 0.02 0.01 0.09 0.09 0.068
Porcelain 0.09 0.09 0.02 0.16 0.1 0.087
Projector 0.02 0.02 0 0.17 0.07 0.046
Radiator 0.04 0.01 0 0.12 0.09 0.035
Settee 0.1 0 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.056
Souvenir 0.13 0.16 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.147
Spatula 0.02 0.04 0 0.17 0.09 0.033
Spotlight 0.17 0.15 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.181
Staircase 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.074
Tablecloth 0.11 0.05 0.03 0.1 0.06 0.094
Tankard 0.04 0 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.049
Television 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.11 0.06 0.177
Toothpaste 0.13 0.05 0 0.11 0.03 0.102
Trolley 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.068
Wireless 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.05 0.074
The threshold for m value (i.e., the activation level of the output unit) is 0.115.
This is the time when the ﬁrst two constituent representations of
the lag-2 item have just entered Implic, as shown in FigureA3. The
phenomenon of fringe awareness indicates that lag-2 targets can
be processed to some extent. So, some of the lag-2 constituent rep-
resentations are likely to be implicationally processed before the
buffer moves away. As a result of these constraints, D1 is sampled
from a narrow Gamma distribution peaks at 200ms and bounded
between 120 and 220ms. The AB curves generally have a sharp
onset and slow recovery, so D2, which is related to blink recovery,
is more variable than D1, and is sampled from a wider Gamma
distribution.
Delay-line length. Each subsystem has a local memory, which
holds its representations before they are sent to other subsystems.
We denote the length of the implicational and propositional
delay-lines by L1 and L2 respectively, which are measured by the
number of constituent representations they hold. We argue that
the lower bound of L1 is set by the fact that the buffer must
move to Prop in time to process the item. Items cannot enter
Prop immediately after being processed at Implic. (If this were
the case, the buffer would have to move immediately to Prop in
order to process it, but this would rule out lag-1 sparing as pre-
viously explained.) Rather, constituent representations progress
along an intermediate portion of delay-line that functionally sits
between the point of implicational salience assessment and the
point of exit from Implic, and buffers (using the standard com-
puter science meaning here) Implic to Prop communication. In
other words, targets that are presented alone in an RSVP stream
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Latent semantic analysis cosines to taboo reference words for key-distractors of Arnell et al. (2007).
Neutral LSA Positive LSA Negative LSA Taboo LSA
Aisle 0.02 Beauty 0.08 Broken 0.07 Aids 0.03
Binder 0.08 Birthday 0.06 Decay 0.04 Ass 0.08
Blimp 0.03 Bouquet 0.05 Decline 0.11 Bastard 0.08
Butter 0 Champ 0.05 Dismay 0.09 Bitch 0.09
Card 0.02 Cheer 0.06 Dull 0.09 Clitoris 0.65
Chat 0.04 Flower 0.05 Faded 0.03 Cock 0.05
Chew 0.03 Friendly 0.13 Fail 0.15 Dildo 0.27
Dazzle 0.01 Fun 0.06 Feeble 0.1 Erotic 0.74
Desk 0.02 Glad 0.08 Guilt 0.32 Fire 0.02
Fish 0 Gold 0.04 Negative 0.12 Fuck 0.26
Gel 0 Happy 0.11 Poorly 0.23 Gun 0.02
Glove 0.03 Holiday 0.02 Punish 0.13 Incest 0.51
Guzzle 0.038 Joyful 0.04 Sad 0.02 Lesbians 0.37
Haggle 0.038 Leisure 0.09 Slave 0.03 Murder 0.07
Jacket 0.07 Prize 0.04 Slob 0.16 Naked 0.17
Justify 0.16 Sky 0.02 Suffer 0.22 Naughty 0.08
Loop 0.04 Smart 0.09 Tedious 0.1 Nipples 0.08
Planet 0.01 Smile 0.1 Thief 0.05 Orgasm 0.78
Rufﬂed 0.07 Sunny 0.01 Tired 0.03 Orgy 0
Spare 0.08 Sweet 0.06 Unhappy 0.14 Penis 0.76
Staple 0 Tender 0.08 Useless 0.06 Piss 0.03
Vote 0.08 Treasure 0.04 Weary 0.05 Rape 0.52
Wire 0.03 Vacation 0.06 Weep 0.04 Sexual 0.87
Zipper 0.01 Winner 0.04 Broken 0.07 Shit 0.09
All negative LSA values are replaced by zeros, and items that do not have LSA entries are replaced by group means. Threshold for taboo relatedness is 0.35.
can be potentially processed by both Implic and Prop, given
the buffer moves with a delay. This is ensured by the following
inequation:
D1 ≤ (L1 + L − 3) × 20ms
where L = 6 denotes the number of constituent representations
in an RSVP item. The right hand side of the inequation is the
delay between an item being detected as implicational salient and
all its constituents entering Prop, as shown in Figure A4. (Note,
the ﬁgure and its caption explain the above inequation in detail.)
Given the values of D1 calculated previously, we found the lower
bound of L1 is around 7.
The recovery of the blink sets the upper bound of L1. That is,
Implic can only process the beginning of the lag-2 item as shown
in Figure A5A,B. The decision is made for the buffer to move back
from Prop to Implic, when Prop has detected three implicationally
unprocessed constituent representations, which is the back end of
the lag-2 item, as shown in FigureA5C. In general, the blink recov-
ers after lag-5. Thus, the buffer should potentially return to Implic
when the lag-5 item enters Implic or soon after that point in time,
as shown in Figure A5D. (Note, the ﬁgure and its caption explain
the above inequation in detail.) Hence, L1 is constrained by the
following inequation.
D2 ≤ (4 × L − L1 − 4) × 20ms
Given the distribution of D2, we set the length of the Implic
delay-line to 10, which is around the mean of the L1 distribu-
tion. The length of the Prop delay-line L2 is unconstrained in this
model because it does not affect the shape of the blink. Thus, for
simplicity, we assume that delay-line lengths are the same for all
subsystems.
Relating to the (white-box) glance–look model
The glance–look model is an intensionalist account (i.e., it is
structurally detailed). Importantly, it uses the delay-line length
and buffer movement delay distributions inferred for the gray-
box model. However, in the white-box model, the salience
assignment threshold is explicitly modeled from word mean-
ing represented in LSA space. The choice of the threshold
for the response unit (as previously introduced) was directly
constrained by the two higher level models, ensuring analo-
gous parameter manipulations in all models. In particularly, the
threshold value makes 52.5% of high salient and 22.2% of low
salient key-distractors implicationally salient. In the glance–look
model, the ratio between high and low salient key-distractors
based on the response unit activation is 52.5/22.2= 2.36. In
the gray-box model, the ratio between high and low salient
key-distractors in the intrinsic probability of identiﬁcation is
0.49/0.19= 2.58. In the extensionalist model, the ratio between
high and low salient key-distractors in the capture constant is
1.8/0.8= 2.25. This similarity suggests that the activation of the
response unit, the intrinsic probability of identiﬁcation and the
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capture constantmodel the same underlying cognitivemechanism
consistently.
Discussion
In the general domain of theory development in cognitive psy-
chology, there has always been something of a tension between
theorists who operate at the level of box-and-arrow models and
those that rely on complete, fully speciﬁed, simulations. Here we
have provided evidence that classic box-and-arrow models can
be implemented at a level appropriate to the constraints built
into the model, and reproduce a dataset in a manner consis-
tent with a purely extensionalist account of the data. We then
showed how the addition of a more detailed account of a key
component, the processing of word meanings, could be added
to reﬁne the model, again maintaining consistency in model
parameters.
Computer science, which has often been used as a metaphor in
the cognitive modeling domain, gives a clear precedent for ana-
lyzing and thinking about modeling a single system in terms of
multiple views. Cognitive science has, of course, developed simi-
lar and parallel conceptualizations to those of computer science;
indeed, Marr famously elaborated a version of this position in his
three levels of cognitive description (Marr,2000).However,despite
Marr’s observations, concretemodeling endeavors in cognitive sci-
ence typically seek to model data accurately and to compete for
adequacy. Rarely, if ever, are multiple abstraction levels explicitly
modeled for the same data while maintaining formal relationships
between models at different levels.
FIGUREA1 |Target report accuracy by lag in humans for high and low salient key-distractors with intrinsic identifications.
FIGUREA2 | Snapshots of the delay-line in the lag-1 case when (A) Implic decides to move the buffer to Prop after it has processed the first three
constituent representations of the key-distractor; (B) the buffer actually moves just after Implic has processed the first three constituent
representations of the target.
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FIGUREA3 | Snapshots of the delay-line when (A) Implic decides to move the buffer to Prop after it has processed the first three constituent
representations of the key-distractor; (B) the first two constituent representations of the lag-2 item (target) have entered Implic.
FIGUREA4 | Snapshots of the delay-line when (A) Implic decides to
move the buffer to Prop after it has processed the first three constituent
representations of the target; (B) the buffer actually moves just after the
last three constituent representations of the target have entered Prop.
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FIGUREA5 | Snapshots of the delay-line when (A) Implic decides to
move the buffer to Prop after it has processed the first three constituent
representations of the key-distractor; (B) buffer actually moves after a
delay of 200ms; (C) Prop decides to move the buffer back to Implic after
it has seen three implicationally un-interpreted constituent
representations; (D) the buffer actually arrives at Implic when the last
three constituent representations of the lag-5 item (target) have entered
Implic.
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